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Abstract
We evaluate accounting-based methods to estimate the implied cost of capital
using a simulation approach. We simulate a model economy in which the true cost
of capital is known and calibrate it to the CRSP-Compustat universe. We then
compare the true cost of capital to the implied cost of capital estimates from ten
different methods proposed in the literature in terms of bias, accuracy, and their
correlation with the true cost of equity capital. Methods based on the residual
income model perform better than those based on the abnormal earnings growth
model. Methods that estimate the cost of capital and expected growth simulta-
neously work reasonably well if they rely on analyst forecasts instead of ex post
realized values, even if analyst forecasts are biased. We suggest combined meth-
ods that are chosen so that the distortions from individual methods compensate
each other and show that some simple combinations outperform all individual
methods.
JEL classifications: C15, E37, M41
Keywords: Implied cost of capital, valuation, residual income, abnormal earnings
growth, simulation
∗We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the collaborative research center SFB TR
15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems and the Rudolph von Bennigsen-Foerder-
foundation. We thank Inessa Love, The World Bank, for sharing her STATA code to estimate vector
autoregressions using panel data sets. We also thank Alon Brav, Ingolf Dittmann, Günther Gebhardt,
Eva Labro, Christian Leuz, Carsten Trenkler, and workshop participants at Maastricht University,
the 2nd WHU Campus for Finance, the 3rd FARS Midyear Conference San Diego, the EAA Annual
Congress Istanbul, and the DGF Annual Meeting Hamburg for helpful comments and advice.
†University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany. E-mail: daske@bwl.uni-mannheim.de. Tel:
+49 621 181 2280.
‡University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany. E-mail: halteren@bwl.uni-mannheim.de.
Tel: +49 621 181 1964.
§University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany. E-mail: maug@bwl.uni-mannheim.de. Tel:
+49 621 181 1952.
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1465294
1 Introduction
In this paper we evaluate accounting-based methods to estimate the implied cost of
equity capital (ICC) using a simulation approach in which the true cost of capital is
known. We show that ICC methods based on the residual income model perform better
than those based on the abnormal earnings growth model. Combinations of several ICC
methods outperform all individual methods if they average ICC estimates from firm-
level calculations with estimates that simultaneously calculate the cost of equity capital
and expected growth for a portfolio of firms.
Previous work has addressed the same issue based on archival data (see Easton
2009, Chapter 8 for a review). This approach faces limitations because the true cost
of equity capital is unobservable, so empirical research can only compare the cost of
capital from ICC methods with (1) the cost of capital generated by an asset pricing
model (Lee, Ng, and Swaminathan 2009), (2) its association with other firm-specific risk
characteristics (Botosan and Plumlee 2005; Brav, Lehavy, and Michaely 2005), and (3)
with realized stock returns (Guay, Kothari, and Shu 2005; Easton and Monahan 2005).
The first approach encounters several well-known shortcomings outlined in the asset-
pricing literature (e.g., Elton 1999; Pastor and Stambaugh 1999; Fama and French 1997,
2002). The second approach requires that the selection of the risk factors considered
is correct and exhaustive, which is unlikely (Easton and Monahan 2005). The third
method is based on realized returns and therefore relies on very noisy estimates (e.g.,
Lundblad 2007; Pastor, Sinha, and Swaminathan 2008). In the light of these limitations,
it may not seem surprising that the rankings and overall evaluation of the ICC methods
differ significantly across studies.1
We perform Monte Carlo simulations of a suitably calibrated economy to address
these shortcomings. Monte Carlo simulations are a well-established scientific approach,
and they have been applied to address a range of questions in accounting and finance
where important aspects of the underlying environment are unobservable so that tests of
theories with real-world data are impossible. In simulations we observe these otherwise
unknown variables by construction.2 The simulation model combines an econometric
1While research that focuses on the association of ICC methods with firm-specific risk characteristics
concludes that some ICC approaches offer reliable estimates (Botosan and Plumlee 2005), research that
focuses on the association with realized returns is skeptical on the reliability of any of these estimates
(Guay, Kothari, and Shu 2005; Easton and Monahan 2005; Easton 2009). See also Botosan, Plumlee,
and Wen (2010) for a more cautious conclusion.
2See e.g., Greenball (1968) for a classical example, and Labro and Vanhoucke (2007, 2008) for
contemporary work. While Greenball's study is an example of studies in financial accounting eval-
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forecasting model, a business planning model, and a DCF-based valuation model. The
model parameters are calibrated to the CRSP-Compustat universe. The valuation
approach is designed so that it is neutral with respect to the specific assumptions of
the ICC methods and therefore creates an appropriate benchmark for comparing and
analyzing these methods.
In the next step of our analysis we use ten extant ICC methods that were proposed in
the literature and calculate the cost of capital these methods generate for 20,000 firms
from 100 industries in our simulated economy.3 We distinguish three broad groups
of ICC methods: (1) residual income methods, which calculate the ICC individually
for each firm; (2) abnormal earnings growth methods, which also determine the ICC
at the firm level, and (3) industry-level methods, which estimate the cost of capital
and expected growth simultaneously for a portfolio of firms.4 Finally, we compare the
ICC from these methods with the true cost of capital, which is known for each firm in
our simulated economy. The evaluation of the ICC methods follows Francis, Olsson,
and Oswald (2000) and applies three criteria: (1) the bias of the method, which is
particularly important for the correct estimation of the equity premium (e.g., Claus
and Thomas 2001); (2) the accuracy of the method, which is significant for all practical
applications of these methods, where correct firm-specific estimates of the cost of capital
are required (e.g., company valuation, project appraisal); (3) the explainability of the
method, which refers to the correlation between the ICC and the true cost of capital;
this criterion is particularly important in research applications that require a proxy for
the cost of capital.
Residual income methods have a small negative bias, whereas abnormal earnings
growth methods have a larger and positive bias. Industry-level methods also tend
to have a positive bias. Residual income methods tend to be the most accurate and
industry-level methods that rely on analyst forecasts perform almost as well, even if
uating different accounting methods and measurement rules (Francis 1990; Rees and Sutcliffe 1993;
Healy, Myers, and Howe 2002), the work of Labro and Vanhoucke is representative for the management
accounting literature evaluating costing systems (Lambert and Larcker 1989; Balachandran, Balakr-
ishnan, and Sivaramakrishnan 1997). Other prominent areas include evaluations of alternative testing
procedures commonly used in accounting research (e.g., Barth and Kallapur 1996; Kothari, Sabino,
and Zach 2005), detecting audit effectiveness (e.g., Knechel 1988), or detecting earnings management
(e.g., Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995).
3We use the term model for a generic modeling framework, for example the residual income model
or the dividend discount model. By contrast, we use the term method for specific methods that
parameterize these models to determine the cost of capital and refer to them as ICC methods.
4We do not further divide industry-level methods, which could also be grouped into these two
categories according to the valuation model they use.
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analyst forecasts are biased. Industry-level methods that rely on ex post realized values
tend to be inaccurate, as do abnormal earnings growth methods. Residual income meth-
ods also have a higher R-squared in regressions of the ICC estimates on the true cost
of capital, where most industry-level methods and all abnormal earnings growth meth-
ods tend to perform poorly. We attribute the generally poor performance of abnormal
earnings growth methods compared to residual income methods to their modeling of
future earnings. Whereas residual income methods model the level of future abnormal
earnings, abnormal earnings growth methods model the changes in abnormal earnings,
which seems to produce less reliable forecasts.
All methods provide distorted estimates of the cost of capital, even if the average
bias is small. Firm-level methods overestimate the cost of capital if the true cost of
capital is high, and underestimate the cost of capital if the true cost of capital is low.
By contrast, most industry-level methods generate the opposite result. We trace this
distortion to the modeling of cash flow patterns by the ICC methods by applying the
concept of equity duration developed in Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman (2004) and call it
the duration effect. Thus, our study contributes by adding this effect to the theoretical
discussions on ICC methods in the literature (e.g., Hughes, Liu, and Liu 2009; Lambert
2009; Pastor, Sinha, and Swaminathan 2008).
Finally, we investigate the possibility that combinations of ICC methods may per-
form better than individual methods.5 The analysis suggests that firm-level methods
have a lower accuracy because they systematically overestimate the true cost of capital
when it is high and vice versa, whereas industry-level methods do the opposite. Com-
bining methods from each category should therefore lead to better estimates because
the errors of the individual methods compensate each other. We find that this is indeed
the case and we highlight two methods that combine two, respectively four, individual
methods and show that they tend to outperform all individual methods as well as prior
ad hoc combinations. In particular, the combination of equally weighted estimates from
Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) and Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis
(2002) provide a useful trade-off between simplicity and the ability to capture the true
cost of equity capital in most circumstances. We conclude the paper with a number of
robustness checks that highlight various aspects of our simulation model and the val-
uation approach. Our main conclusions are robust to changing details of our research
design.
5The general argument for combinations is based on Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009) and Dhaliwal,
Krull, and Li (2007).
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A number of papers address the shortcomings of ICC methods or suggest improve-
ments of existing methods. One area of improvements is the replacement of analyst
forecasts with realized values (Easton and Sommers 2007; O'Hanlon and Steele 2000)
or with a statistical forecasting model (Hou, Van Dijk, and Zhang 2010). These anal-
yses are complementary to ours because we derive the properties of ICC methods in a
context in which unbiased forecasts are already available. Botosan and Plumlee (2005)
and Easton and Monahan (2005) use different methodologies based on empirical data
that reveal some shortcomings of existing ICC methods. By contrast, our simulation
approach opens the black box, analyzes the structure of ICC methods and derives diag-
nostics in an environment where the true cost of equity capital is known. On this basis
we can identify the errors that are systematically built into specific methods and can
then suggest combinations of methods that benefit from compensating errors. Ours is
not only the first study to evaluate industry-level ICC methods, but also contributes
by showing how their specific properties add to the construction of combined methods.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The following Section 2 de-
velops the simulation approach for our model economy. We discuss the different ICC
methods and how we implement them in Section 3. Section 4 contains the main analy-
sis. In Section 5 we evaluate how the individual methods may be combined. Section 6
presents robustness checks and Section 7 concludes with a discussion of the limitations
of our approach and suggestions for future research.
2 Methodology: Simulating a model economy
We conduct our simulation by setting up a business planning model, where we fore-
cast a complete set of financial statements (i.e. income statement, balance sheet, and
statement of cash flows) for an economy of 20,000 firms for 50 years.6 We calibrate
the parameters of our model to those of a large sample of U.S. firms. As common
in financial modeling and corporate valuation, we use sales growth and profitability
(EBITDA-margin) as our main value drivers (percentage-of-sales model).7 We empir-
ically estimate the parameters that describe the joint time series of these two variables.
Sales growth rates and EBITDA-margins are then the random variables in our Monte
Carlo simulation from which all other accounting and cash flow items in the projected
6All calculations for this Monte Carlo simulations are implemented using MATLAB.
7We use a simplified textbook approach, see, for example, Lundholm and Sloan (2007) or Penman
(2009).
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financial statements are calculated, mostly as percentages of sales. In the final step, we
draw each firm's cost of capital from a distribution and calculate the value of this firm
in our simulated economy by discounting its future expected cash flows at this rate.
Thus, we obtain for each firm in our simulation a complete set of financial statements, a
cost of capital, realized and expected future cash flows and earnings, and an associated
firm value.
The empirical basis for calibrating our model rests on an unbalanced panel of firms
from 1970 to 2009, which we obtain from the CRSP-Compustat Merged data file. We
only use non-financial firms listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. We derive bal-
ance sheet and income statement items from the Compustat files, while returns, divi-
dends, and market capitalization are obtained from CRSP. We are left with a sample
of 96,719 firm-year observations for 8,036 firms. The median firm-year in our sample
has sales of $170.2 million, total assets of $154.9 million, and a market capitalization
of $143.28 million (these numbers are not tabulated).
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
Table 1 summarizes the salient financial ratios for our sample and the model pa-
rameters we use for our simulation. We typically use the median of the distribution of
a ratio and round the model parameters (e.g., the median ratio of property, plant and
equipment to sales is 21.5%, but we use 20%). We deviate from the median firm in
some instances (e.g., the plowback rate) in order to achieve a better overall calibration,
particularly of the valuation ratios (PE ratio and market-to-book ratio). We provide the
reason for these decisions and an assessment of the quality of our calibrations below and
later perform robustness checks to show that our modeling choices are inconsequential
for our main results.
2.1 Forecasting sales growth and EBITDA-margins
Vector autoregressions. We model a firm's sales growth and EBITDA margins as a
first-order vector autoregressive process (VAR(1)).8 Unlike a univariate autoregressive
(AR) model, vector autoregressions also model the cross-dependence of margins on
sales growth and vice versa and therefore model also the dynamic behavior of the
correlation between these key value drivers. Denote the rate of sales growth in period t
8For a review of vector autoregressive models, see Brooks (2008). We follow the approach used in
Love and Zicchino (2006) or Dorn, Huberman, and Sengmueller (2008).
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(i.e., Salest/Salest−1  1) for firm i by gSi,t and the EBITDA margin (henceforth simply:
margin) by mi,t. We then estimate the following model:
9
gSi,t = α0,i + αgg
S
i,t−1 + αmmi,t−1 + εi,t, (1)
mi,t = γ0,i + γgg
S
i,t−1 + γmmi,t−1 + ηi,t. (2)
We run the vector autoregression from (1) and (2) on our sample using panel VAR
regression analysis. We winsorize the data for sales growth and EBITDA margins at
the 1% level to reduce the impact of extreme outliers.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
Panel A of Table 2 reports the results for the panel vector autoregression of sales
growth and EBITDA margins. Shocks to margins exhibit some persistence (γm =
0.596), whereas the impact of sales growth on past sales growth is rather weak (αg =
0.166). There is an economically meaningful and negative impact of past margins on
sales growth (αm = −0.166). Also, there is a significant positive correlation of 0.354
between the contemporaneous shocks to margins ηi,t and to cash flows εi,t (panel B).
We would miss these effects with univariate autoregressions. By contrast, the impact
of past sales on profitability is statistically insignificant (γg = −0.004).
Our first-order VAR framework with two variables strikes a balance between sim-
plicity and realism. We also experimented with second-order VAR processes, but found
that second-order lags in equations (1) and (2) are only marginally significant and gen-
erate virtually identical impulse response functions. The key feature of the processes
modeled here is the persistence of shocks, i.e., the length of time for which a shock to
margins or sales growth has an impact on each of the value drivers. Whether the model
captures the dynamic evolution of the value drivers more closely seems immaterial for
valuation.
Simulations. In our Monte Carlo simulation, we generate 200 industries of 100 firms
each, and for each industry we generate values for sales growth and margins from the
processes (1) and (2). If t = 0 marks the beginning of our business planning model, then
9In fact, we estimate this model after first demeaning (subtracting the time-series mean for each
variable and for each firm) and then applying a so-called Helmert transformation (see Arellano and
Bover 1995, pp. 41-43, for details). As a result, we do not obtain and therefore do not report intercepts
or R-squareds.
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we start the processes at t = −4 because for some applications we need information
about prior periods, and we end the process at t = 1 to obtain realized values for those
methods that use ex post realizations.10 We do not simulate values for periods later
than t = 1 because for later periods we only need expected values. Expected values are
always generated for 50 periods. We use the parameters from panels A and B of Table
2 with two modifications.
First, we draw the beginning values at t = −4 for sales growth and for the margin
from normal distributions. The distribution of the beginning value for sales growth
has a mean of 6.0% and a standard deviation of 20.0%. The median in the data from
Table 1 is 10.6% for sales growth and 19.9% for the time-series standard deviation of
sales growth. The mean sales growth rate of 6% in the simulations differs from the
median growth rate of 10.6% in our sample (see Table 1), because we obtain better
approximations for our valuation ratios for reasons we develop further below. Note
that only the time-series variation and not the cross-sectional variation is relevant for
calibrating the time series processes (1) and (2). The mean for the beginning value of
the margin is 12% with a standard deviation of 5.0%, where the empirical values from
Table 1 are 11.4% and 4.7%, respectively. We apply the same standard deviations to
the residuals εi,t and ηi,t in (1) and (2) as we use for the initial values. We model these
using a joint distribution based on the empirical correlation of 0.354.
Second, we do not obtain estimates for the intercept coefficients α0 and γ0 from the
panel VARs (see also footnote 9). Instead, we set these coefficients so that the long-
term values for sales growth and the margin from processes (1) and (2) converge to
firm-specific long-term values and report the average values in panel C of Table 2. We
draw long-term sales growth for each firm from a truncated normal distribution with a
mean of 6% and a standard deviation of 2%. Similarly, long-term margins are drawn
from a truncated normal distribution with a mean of 12% and a standard deviation of
1%. In both cases, the distribution is truncated to values within two standard deviations
of the mean. Drawing long-term growth rates and margins from a distribution allows
us to differentiate between different types of firms, particularly growth stocks and value
stocks. We obtain the intercepts α0,i and γ0,i for our simulations by substituting εi,t = 0,
ηi,t = 0, and the firm-specific values for long-term sales growth and the long-term margin
into equations (1) and (2) and then solving for the intercept values. For the average
10The model by Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) requires information about prior periods
in order to calculate industry averages for the return on equity. Easton and Sommers (2007) use
realizations of period t = 1.
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across the firm-specific intercepts we obtain α0 = 0.070 and γ0 = 0.049.
Figure 1 presents the impulse response functions of sales growth and margins for
the first 10 periods in response to a single positive, one standard deviation shock to
growth (panel A) and a one standard deviation shock to the margin (panel B). We see
that the processes converge relatively fast and are close to their original values after
about 4 to 6 periods after the arrival of the shock if no further shocks arrive. Shocks to
margins are more persistent, whereas shocks to growth have no impact on the margin.
Figure 1: Impulse response functions
This figure plots the impulse response function for the sales growth and margin equations (1) and
(2). The left figure shows the reactions of sales growth and margins from a one standard deviation
shock (20%) to the growth rate in t = 0. The right figure highlights the reactions for a one standard
deviation shock (5%) to the margin in t = 0.
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Forecasting and expectations. For calculating firm values and for implementing
the ICC methods, we have to generate market expectations as well as analyst forecasts
about future earnings and cash flows. We generate forecasts for each firm from our
VAR-estimates by first inserting the beginning values of margin and sales growth as
well as the estimates for the coefficients in (1) and (2) to obtain expected sales growth
and margins in period t = 1. We then use these forecasts iteratively to obtain forecasts
for period t = 2 and repeat the exercise to estimate forecasts for all periods within the
detailed planning horizon of 50 periods in our baseline simulation.
Our baseline approach assumes rational expectations. In particular, we assume
that the forecasts of investors in the stock market and analyst forecasts are the same,
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and that both of them use the correct model of the economy when valuing the firm.
This assumption is potentially a strong one because analyst forecast bias is a widely-
documented phenomenon (e.g., Brown 1993; Easton and Sommers 2007). We therefore
include a robustness check where we allow for optimism on the part of analysts.
Terminal values. For the terminal value after the detailed planning horizon we model
terminal sales growth denoted by gi,T as a truncated normal random variable that varies
for each firm on the interval [-3%;+3%] with a mean of 0% and a standard deviation of
1%. Hence terminal growth is equal to zero on average, but not equal to zero for every
firm. We later check for the impact of our terminal value assumptions by shortening or
extending the detailed planning period.
2.2 Generating company values from a business planning model
Income statements. We denote expectations for sales growth and margins from our
forecasting model with gˆSi,t = E(g
S
i,t) and mˆi,t = E(mi,t), respectively. Based on these
forecasts, we can then calculate expected sales and EBITDA from:
Si,t = (1 + gˆ
S
i,t)Si,t−1, (3)
EBITDAi,t = mˆi,t × Si,t. (4)
We set initial sales S0 to 100. We calculate depreciation as a percentage of sales and
deduct it from EBITDA to obtain EBIT, and then deduct taxes at a rate of 35% of EBIT
(if EBIT is positive) to obtain bottom-line net income.11 Finally, retained earnings are
equal to the plowback rate times net income; the remaining earnings are distributed as
dividends. The plowback rate pb varies for each firm according to a truncated normal
distribution on the interval [0.2;0.8] with mean equal 0.5 and a standard deviation of
0.1.
Balance sheets. We construct a highly simplified balance sheet that consists only of
cash, current assets (ca) and property plant, and equipment (ppe) on the assets side, and
current liabilities (cl) and shareholders' equity (book value of equity, bv) on the liabilities
and equity side. Hence, we assume that firms are fully equity financed and abstract
from debt financing. Including interest-paying debt would require modeling the cost
11We do not account for tax-loss carry-forwards or carry-backs.
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of debt, debt issues, and the possibility of bankruptcy over time and would produce
significantly more complexities without generating additional results. We therefore
include only current liabilities.
Current assets, net PPE, and current liabilities are all calculated as percentages of
contemporaneous sales using the ratios from Table 1. The book value of equity bvt
always obeys the clean surplus condition:
bvt = bvt−1 + et − dt, (5)
where et denotes total earnings (net income) and dt denotes total dividends. Cash is
the plug variable and therefore calculated as:
casht = clt + bvt − ppet − cat. (6)
Steady-state behavior. The assumptions about the model parameters, in particular
the percentage-of-sales ratios, have direct implications for the long-term behavior of our
business planning model. For each firm, each financial ratio converges to some steady-
state value. In the appendix we show that the return on equity converges to (denote
long-term steady state values by upper bars):
roe =
gSi
pb
. (7)
In our model, the return on equity therefore results from the assumptions about the
plowback ratio and the long-term growth rate. In the appendix we also show that the
equity-sales ratio bvt/St converges to:(
bv
S
)
=
(
1 + gSi
)
(m− d) (1− T ) pb
gSi
. (8)
Given our baseline model parameters, the steady-state value of the equity-to-sales ratio
from (8) equals 0.402 for the typical simulated firm, which has a plowback rate of 0.5,
a long-term growth rate of 6%, and a long-term margin of 12%.
We calibrate the model so that the typical simulated firm is in a steady state, so
that for this firm all financial ratios, including the ROE and the equity-sales ratio, start
out in the steady state. We therefore set the initial book value bv0 to 40, i.e., to 40% of
initial sales. For the typical simulated firm we also obtain a steady-state value of 12%
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for the ROE from (7), which is equal to its starting value. However, given that the true
cost of capital as well as the expected growth rates are stochastic, it is only the median
firm that is in a steady state. Firms with higher growth have a higher ROE from (7)
and converge to a lower equity-to-sales ratio from (8) and vice versa for low-growth
firms.
Statements of cash flows. We obtain free cash flows (fcft) from earnings by adding
back depreciation (dept) and subtracting investments in working capital and capital
expenditures (changes in net PPE):
fcft = et + dept −∆Working capital−∆Net PPE
= et + dept − (cat − clt − (cat−1 − clt−1))− (ppet − ppet−1 + dept). (9)
Cost of capital. We draw the cost of capital from a distribution that allows us to
evaluate firm-level methods as well as industry-level ICC methods and that is also
consistent with the notion that growth stocks have a lower cost of capital than value
stocks, thus capture the insight that the CoEC are not independent from the cash flow
risks of the firm (e.g. Beaver, Kettler, and Scholes 1970). More specifically, the cost of
equity capital rE,i of firm i are given by
rE,i = rE,Ind + a(g¯
S
i − g¯) + εi, (10)
where rE,Ind is the cost of equity capital (CoEC) of firm i 's industry and
(
g¯Si − g¯
)
is the
deviation of firm i 's long-term growth rate from the overall mean of 6%. We draw the
industry cost of capital from a normal distribution with a mean of 10% and a standard
deviation of 4%.12 The distribution is winsorized at the risk-free rate rf of 4.5%. Then
we draw the firm-specific component εi of the CoEC from a distribution with a mean
of zero and a standard deviation of 1%. Finally, we set a = −0.5, which generates a
difference in mean expected equity returns between the highest book-to-market decile
and the lowest book-to-market decile of 10.4% and introduces a link between cash flow
shocks and shocks to expected returns. Fama and French (1992) find return differences
between the highest and lowest book-to-market decile of around 16.7%, while Lettau and
12Easton and Monahan (2005), Table 2, report cost of equity capital in a range from 8.8% to 12.9%,
depending on the ICC method used. Other studies comparing ICC methods report only average risk
premia over time, and thus do not provide a suitable direct benchmark. Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman
(2004) use rE = 12% to calibrate their model.
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Wachter (2007) document a difference of only 4.9%.13 We therefore use an intermediate
value in our simulation. With these parameters, the overall standard deviation of the
cost of capital in our economy is therefore
√
0.042 + 0.012 + (−0.5)2 0.022 = 0.042.
Research has identified a range of factors other than the book-to-market ratio and
the value versus growth distinction that also affect the cost of capital, some for reasons
that are not yet fully understood. Prominent examples are firm size, stock market
liquidity, and disclosure quality.14 We abstract from these variables, which are outside
of our modeling framework. In many ways we see this aspect as an advantage of our
more clinical approach. The features of the ICC methods that emerge from the simple
model economy would in all likelihood also carry over to a more realistic model that
would feature these additional effects. Similarly, we draw only one CoEC for each firm
and assume that these CoEC do not change over time and are known to investors. The
effects analyzed by Hughes, Liu, and Liu (2009) are therefore absent from our model.
Equity values. We construct forecasts for all free cash flows as explained above and
then calculate the market value of the equity of each firm i using the firms' drawn
cost of capital and a standard DCF-approach (e.g., Lundholm and Sloan 2007; Penman
2009). We denote these simulated firm values generated by the model by PDGP0 , where
DGP stands for data generating process:
PDGPi,0 =
50∑
t=1
E0(fcfi,t)
(1 + rE,i)t
+
E0(fcfi,50)(1 + gi,T )
(rE,i − gi,T )(1 + rE,i)50 . (11)
Our results are robust if we use the dividend discount model instead of the DCF model
(11) to generate firm values.
2.3 Comparison of the simulated economy to real data
We generate 200 industries of 100 firms each using the design described in the previous
two sections. For 11 out of 20,000 firms (0.1%) the market value of equity is smaller
than or equal to zero.15 We classify these firms as bankrupt and remove them from
13See Fama and French (1992), Table 4, which computes a difference of 1.4% for monthly returns,
and Lettau and Wachter (2007), Table 1.
14See Hail and Leuz (2006) for a comprehensive set of factors that influence the CoEC empirically.
15This may happen for firms with negative current margins in combination with high cost of capital.
The negative margins generate negative free cash flows in the current periods. Later long-term positive
free cash flows sometimes do not suffice to outweigh the earlier negative free cash flows if the discount
12
further analyses.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
Table 3 compares the simulated values with the archival data in Table 1 for key
financial ratios. For each ratio, we calculate the difference between the quantiles for
the simulated distribution and the respective quantile for the empirical distribution. We
approximate the medians for sales growth, EBITDA-margin, the market-to-book ratio,
and the PE-ratio very well. The market-to-book ratio is lower by 0.20 and the PE ratio
is lower by 0.93 compared to the Compustat sample. The median return on assets is
2.21% higher in the simulations than the corresponding figure in our sample, whereas the
median return on equity is higher in the simulations by 0.08%. Since we do not model
leverage, we can only calibrate one profitability ratio and therefore choose to calibrate
the return on equity, which is more relevant for the valuation models. Overall, we
have slightly lower valuation ratios and a higher profitability in our simulated economy
relative to the empirical sample. We use a plowback rate of only 50% because a higher
rate leads to large book equity values and correspondingly lower market-to-book ratios.
The median plowback rate of firm-years in which cash is distributed is 65% in our
empirical sample (see Table 1). We show later that this decision is inconsequential
for our results. Sales growth differs significantly from the empirical data because we
obtain better calibrations with a rate of 6%. This choice is realistic for two reasons.
First, the empirical sample suffers from survivorship bias and under represents firms
with low growth rates, especially bankrupt firms. Second, growth in profits and growth
in margins are closely linked in our model, but not in the data where firms also grow
through zero-NPV projects like acquisitions that add to sales growth but much less to
value growth.
We match the tail behavior of the empirical distribution not as accurately as the
median. These differences between the simulation and our sample come from a number
of simplifications. We use normal distributions throughout, whereas the distributions
of the data are skewed and have tails that are different from those of the normal
distribution (compare means and medians for key ratios in Table 1). Also, we model
only the correlation between sales growth and margin in our VAR-estimations, but
ignore correlations between other financial ratios. Finally, our simulations generate
values based on a typical firm with key parameters (terminal growth, plowback rate)
rate is high, which then leads to market values below zero.
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perturbed by random variables. Moreover, the medians in Table 1 do not correspond
to a typical firm, since the median of each parameter corresponds to a different firm.
In summary, our simulated values are more symmetric and more concentrated
around the mean than our empirical sample. To some extent these differences are
a cost we incur for the simplifications we make in our simulation. The corresponding
benefit is that we do not need to winsorize or truncate to eliminate outliers, approaches
commonly employed in empirical studies. Also, the results of our study are more rep-
resentative for a typical firm. We run several robustness checks on our key modeling
assumptions and show that our key results are not sensitive to the particular parameter
values chosen here.
3 Implied Cost of Capital Methods
In this section we develop the ten different Implied Cost of Capital (ICC) methods we
compare in our subsequent analysis. The starting point of all these methods is the
dividend discount model (DDM), which values the equity of a firm as:
P0 =
t=∞∑
t=1
dt
(1 + rE)
t . (12)
Assuming Modigliani and Miller (1961) dividend irrelevance, the dividend discount
model (12) and the DCF model (11) generate the same equity value P0.
16 We distin-
guish between three groups of methods, all of which can be derived from the DDM:
(1) two firm-level methods based on the residual income model, which includes Claus
and Thomas (2001) and Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001); (2) four firm-level
methods based on the abnormal earnings growth model (AEG model), which includes
Gode and Mohanram (2003) and a number of methods based on capitalization ratios,
which are discussed in Easton (2004); (3) four industry-level methods, which rely also
on either the residual income model or on the AEG model, but estimate the cost of
equity capital at the industry-level rather than at the firm level and simultaneously
infer a long-term growth rate. Table 4 summarizes the key characteristics of these
16Note that our simulation model does not assume dividend irrelevance. In the model, retained
earnings generate a return that is determined by the profitability implied by the EBITDA-process,
which generally differs from the cost of equity of the firm.
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methods.17 For all models we keep very closely to the assumptions in the respective
original articles.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Residual income methods. The generic equation of the residual income model can
be written as:
P0 = bv0 +
T∑
t=1
aet
(1 + rE)
t +
aeT+1
(rE − gae) (1 + rE)T
, (13)
where aet denotes residual income or abnormal earnings (we use both terms inter-
changeably) at time t and gae is the long-term growth of residual income. We imple-
ment the method of Claus and Thomas (2001) (henceforth CT) by using T = 5 and
gae = rf−3% = 1.5%, since we assume rf = 4.5% throughout. CT use analyst forecasts
for expected future earnings for the first five periods, whereas we use the forecasts of
earnings from the time-series forecasts and our business planning model. As in CT, the
book equity forecasts are obtained assuming a plow-back rate of 50%. The ICC is then
obtained as an internal rate of return from (13).
We implement the method of Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001) (GLS) with
T = 12 and gae = 0. Furthermore, we can rewrite aet = (roet − rE) bvt−1, where roet
is the book return on equity. For the first three periods we use the explicit forecasts
from our forecasting model. From t = 3 to t = 12 we use a linear interpolation between
roe3 and the industry median roe over all firms in the same industry during the last 5
years (periods t = −4 to t = 0, see above), where we exclude all firm-year observations
of firms with negative net income.
We obtain the book equity forecasts for GLS using an endogenous payout ratio,
which equals the current realized payout ratio if net income is positive; otherwise the
payout ratio equals current dividends divided by 6% of total assets. Also, if the esti-
mated payout ratio is larger than 1 or smaller than 0, the ratio is set equal the respective
boundary values. The ICC is again obtained as an IRR from (13).
17Easton (2009) provides a comprehensive survey of these methods. See also Table 1 in Easton and
Monahan (2005).
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Abnormal earnings growth (AEG) methods. The AEG model rests on the def-
inition of abnormal earnings growth ∆aet ≡ aet − aet−1:
∆aet = ∆et − rE (et−1 − dt−1)
= ∆et − rE∆bvt−1, (14)
where the second line assumes the clean surplus condition. Note that the AEG model
does not generally assume clean surplus, but this condition always holds in our business
planning model. With the clean surplus condition imposed, the residual income model
and the AEG model are isomorphic. The generic valuation equation for the AEG model
is:
P0 =
1
re
[
e1 +
T−1∑
t=1
∆aet+1
(1 + rE)
t +
∆aeT+1
(1 + rE)
T−1 (rE − gaeg)
]
, (15)
which decomposes the value of equity into capitalized earnings and future earnings
growth (see also Ohlson and Gao 2006).
Gode and Mohanram (2003) (GM) use T = 1 (so the middle term in (15) drops
out). Then:
P0 =
e1
re
+
∆ae2
re (re − gaeg) , (16)
which can be rewritten as a quadratic equation. We obtain the CoEC as the larger
square root of this quadratic equation. GM set gaeg = rf − 3%. Dividend forecasts are
obtained using the same procedure as for the GLS method.18
Easton (2004) uses gaeg = 0, so that (16) simplifies to:
P0 =
∆e2 + rEd1
r2E
. (17)
The CoEC is then obtained as rE =
√
1/MPEG, where MPEG denotes the modified
PEG ratio: MPEG = P0/(∆e2+rEd1). Similarly, with the additional assumption d1 = 0
and the definition PEG = P0/∆e2, Easton (2004) obtains the CoEC as rE =
√
1/PEG.
Note that by construction, MPEG < PEG so that the MPEG ratio leads to a higher
estimate of the cost of capital than the PEG ratio if dividends are positive. Finally, if
we assume also that ∆aet = 0 for all t ≥ 2, then (16) simplifies to P0 = e1/rE, so that
rE = 1/PE. We implement all four applications of the AEG model in the same way,
18Note that GM use the average of the two year growth and the I/B/E/S growth rate to avoid losing
observations. We use the model in the original form in (16).
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by using forecasts of dividends, earnings, and book values from our business planning
model and then inferring the cost of capital according to the formulae above. Like
Easton (2004) we set d1 = d0 and apply the MPEG method only to firms where ∆e2 ≥ 0.
Note from (17) that this assumption imposes a stricter condition than necessary.
Industry-level methods. Industry-level methods infer the cost of capital and the
growth rate simultaneously by rewriting the perpetual version of a valuation model so
that it resembles a linear regression equation. We describe the approach of Easton
(2004) as an example. He uses the two-period AEG model and rearranges (16) to
obtain:
e2 + rEd1
V0
= rE (rE − gaeg) + (1 + gaeg) e1
P0
. (18)
We run a linear regression of e2+rEd1
V0
on the forward earnings-to-price ratio e1/P0 for all
firms in the same industry. We begin by assuming a starting value of 12% for rE and
then recover one cost of capital estimate and one implied growth rate for each industry
from the regression coefficients in (18). We recalculate the dependent variable e2+rEd1
V0
with the values obtained and then iterate regression (18) until the estimates of the cost
of equity capital and of the implied growth rate converge.19
The other portfolio approaches follow a similar logic. O'Hanlon and Steele (2000)
use the residual income equation (13) with T = 1 (hence, the middle term in (13) drops
out) and obtain a regression equation with the realized book return on equity roe1 as
the dependent variable. Accordingly, we implement their regression approach and use
realized instead of forecasted earnings to calculate roe1.
Easton, Taylor, Shroff, and Sougiannis (2002) (ETSS) start with the two-stage for-
mulation of the residual income model (13) with T = 4 and obtain a formulation similar
to that of O'Hanlon and Steele after aggregating earnings and dividends for the first
four years. We implement ETSS by running a linear regression of their measure of four-
period cum-dividend earnings, scaled by the book value of equity, on the price-to-book
ratio P0/bv0 for all firms in the same industry.
Easton and Sommers (2007) also start from the perpetual version of the residual
income formula, but then assume that perpetual growth gae starts at t = 0. They
therefore obtain a regression equation in terms of roe0 instead of roe1. With this
modification the implementation of their approach is similar to that of O'Hanlon and
19Convergence is achieved if both the change in the growth rate and the change in the cost of capital
between two iterations is smaller than 10−10.
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Steele (2000).
4 Analysis
We start our analysis by comparing the ten individual methods for estimating the
implied cost of capital. We follow Francis, Olsson, and Oswald (2000) and evaluate
each method primarily in terms of its bias, accuracy, and explainability, where the
latter refers to the correlation between the implied cost of capital and the true cost of
capital. The importance of each of these criteria depends on the application, which we
outline in the Introduction and discuss further in the Conclusion. We discuss the bias,
accuracy, and feasibility in the next section 4.1 and defer the more involved analysis of
explainability to Section 4.2.
4.1 Bias, accuracy, and feasibility
The starting point for each criterion is the difference δMi ≡ rME,i − rE,i between the
implied cost of capital rME,i estimated by method M and the true cost of capital rE,i.
Table 5 reports the results for bias and accuracy.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
Bias. Bias is defined as the sample mean or median of δMi . For all methods except
GM and the MPEG ratio the mean and the median bias is below 2% in absolute value,
which seems acceptably small. The residual income methods (CT and GLS) both
slightly underestimate the cost of capital and have the lowest bias in absolute value.
Three of the four methods based on the abnormal earnings growth model (GM, PEG
ratio, MPEG ratio) overestimate the cost of capital, and the AEG methods have on
average the largest bias in absolute value. All industry-level methods except Easton
overestimate the cost of capital by about 1.1% on average.
We suspect that the firm-level methods generate biased ICC estimates because they
rely on incorrect assumptions about the growth rate. Standard valuation analysis sug-
gests that ICC methods should be more biased upward if they assume a growth rate
that is too high. Then the upward bias in the growth rate would translate into higher
model valuations, and, accordingly, a higher ICC. We analyze this point further by
estimating implied long-term growth rates for each firm-level method in column (3) of
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Table 5. This growth rate equates the true value of each firm with the model value
given the true cost of capital. The bias in the growth rate in column (4) of Table 5
is the difference between the implied growth rate and the growth rate assumed by the
method. As expected, the biases are negative for the two residual income methods, but
positive for GM. For all methods except ETSS the bias of the ICC is the same as the
bias of the growth rate.
The positive bias of the three AEG methods follows from the fact that here the
assumption is about the growth of abnormal earnings growth, i.e., about the growth
of ∆ae, whereas the growth rate in residual income methods refers to ae itself.20 For
example, GM assumes growth of ∆ae of 1.5% per year, which implies much stronger
earnings growth and therefore a higher valuation compared to the assumption of 1.5%
of the level of abnormal earnings by Claus and Thomas (see Table 4 for the model
assumptions). In fact, we can have positive growth of residual income (∆aet > 0) even
if abnormal earnings growth itself is constant or even negative. The negative implied
growth rate of -17.4% for GM only implies that residual income will stop growing at
some point, which does not rule out that it remains at a high level. A similar comment
applies to MPEG, which assumes zero growth of abnormal earnings growth, which is still
a much stronger assumption than the zero growth assumption of residual income made
by GLS. We conclude from this discussion that the AEG methods with the standard
growth assumptions in the literature are poorly calibrated.
The industry-level methods tend to display a low bias. Here the implied growth
rates shown in column (3) are the growth rates predicted by these methods as part of
the ICC estimation. While the bias for the implied growth rates is typically large, it
does not translate one for one into a strong bias for the ICC.
Our results correspond broadly to those of Easton and Monahan (2005). We report
their median ICC estimates for seven of their methods we also investigate in Table 5.21
Their ICC estimates are equal to the true CoEC, which is unknown in their setting, plus
the bias of the methods. Like them, we find the lowest ICC estimate for the PE ratio
and the highest for GM, and observe that the ordering of their estimates for empirical
data corresponds broadly to the ordering we obtain for simulated data.
20In some sense, g in residual income models refers to the first derivative of the valuation function
V (g), whereas in AEG models g refers to the second derivative of the valuation function.
21See their Table 2, which reports results for CT, GLS, GM, PE, PEG, MPEG, and Easton (2004).
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Accuracy. Accuracy refers to the typical error δMi of the ICC estimates. We report
the median absolute value and the standard deviation of δMi in columns (6) and (7)
of Table 5. The accuracy of ICC methods is on average low with a median absolute
deviation of 2.4% and a standard deviation of 3.9% across all methods, which is large
relative to a median cost of equity capital of 10%. Both measures of accuracy vary
significantly across methods, but are very consistent in terms of the implied rankings
of the methods.22 Accuracy tends to be higher for the residual income methods and
for the industry-level methods, but is consistently poor for all AEG methods. CT has
the highest accuracy (1.5% absolute deviation, 1.9% standard deviation), whereas the
PEG ratio has the highest standard deviation (7.1%) and GM has the highest absolute
deviation (3.7%).
We attribute the superiority of the residual income (RI) methods over the AEG
methods to the modeling approach itself. In addition to the differences between the
methods discussed above, RI methods make use of the information contained in the book
value of equity, whereas AEG methods ignore this information, which leads to larger
estimation errors for the ICC. We also suspect that RI methods perform better because
they use longer forecasting horizons and therefore incorporate more information. In
untabulated tests we develop a two-period version of the method of Claus and Thomas,
which is more comparable to the AEG methods.23 We find that such a modified method
performs worse than the original CT method, but still outperforms all AEG methods.
This observation supports the conclusion that it is the modeling approach and not just
the length of the forecast horizon that explains the difference between the results for
AEG methods and for RI methods.
Among the industry-level methods, those that use realized values (O'Hanlon and
Steele, Easton and Sommers) rank below those based on analyst forecasts in terms of
accuracy. However, our simulation approach may exaggerate the difference between
methods based on analyst forecasts and those based on realized values because we
assume rational expectations, i.e. we equate analyst forecasts with forecasts based on
the correct model, an issue we address in our robustness checks. Similarly, reported
earnings in practice might have more predictive ability for future earnings than in our
simulated economy (e.g., by impounding managers' private information).
22We also calculate the root mean squared error (RMSE), which implies almost the same ranking of
methods as the standard deviation and is therefore not tabulated.
23We acknowledge that the AEG methods were designed to reflect frequently used valuation heuris-
tics, and in particular to utilize solely the next two periods' analyst forecasts because of their frequent
availability in practice. See e.g. Bradshaw (2002, 2004) and Easton (2004).
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Feasibility. We note that the applicability of a method to the widest possible sample
is also a quality criterion, particularly in empirical applications. Some methods cannot
calculate the implied cost of capital for each firm in our sample. In particular, all
two-period AEG methods can be applied only to about 61% of the firms in our model
economy (column (8) of Table 5), whereas the other methods generate estimates for the
cost of capital in almost all cases.24
4.2 Explainability
We analyze explainability by running simple bivariate regressions of the implied cost
of capital on the true cost of capital for each method and report the estimates for the
intercept and slope as well as the R-squared from these regressions in Table 6. The
table shows results for OLS (columns (1) to (3)) and for median regressions (columns
(4) to (6)), which are more robust to outliers. The discussion below focuses on the OLS
regressions.
[Insert Table 6 here.]
R-squared. Our first measure of explainability is the R-squared, which displays a
striking variation across methods from 27% (Easton and Sommers) to 89% (Easton).
Firm-specific residual income methods perform best with R-squareds of 88% (CT) and
83% (GLS), respectively. AEG methods perform worst, with R-squareds between 32%
and 65% and an average of 48%. Industry-level methods are in between with an average
R-squared of 56%. Methods that work with realized values (O'Hanlon and Steele,
Easton and Sommers) perform poorly, as realizations seem to introduce significant
noise into cost of capital calculations. Note that the same caveat as in the case of
accuracy with respect to analyst forecasts and the predictive power of realized earnings
applies here as well. The ranking in terms of R-squared and the ranking in terms of
median bias from Table 5 tend to agree, i.e. a higher average bias (in absolute value)
tends to correspond to lower explainability in terms of R-squared.
Regression-coefficient on CoEC. If the implied cost of capital methods were un-
biased, then the univariate regressions should have an intercept of zero and a slope
24We restrict the algorithm to search for the implied cost of capital in the unit interval, but in a
small number of cases it can only find solutions that are either negative or higher than 100%. In theses
cases the algorithm returns a missing value.
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coefficient of one. Table 5 reveals that this prediction is not borne out by the data. For
all firm-level methods, the intercept is negative and the estimated CoEC-coefficient in
the regression exceeds one significantly. For all industry-level methods except Easton
the opposite conclusion holds.
Hence, while the average bias for most methods is small, many methods still have
a low accuracy because they distort the estimates for companies with true CoEC that
are either very low or very high. To illustrate this point, consider the ICC estimates for
GLS when the true CoEC is five percentage points away from its mean of 10%. Then
the ICC estimate is biased downward by 1.3% if the true cost of capital is only 5%, and
the estimate is biased upward by 0.8% if the true cost of capital is 15%.25 By contrast,
for three of the four industry-level methods, the opposite bias obtains. For example,
for ETSS we obtain a positive bias of 3.2% if the true CoEC is 5%, and a negative bias
of -0.9% if the true CoEC is 15%. The effect is therefore economically large, even for
those ICC methods where the average bias is small.
We label the deviation of the true CoEC from the ICC estimates distortion and refer
to the regression coefficient on the true CoEC as the distortion coefficient. The effect
differs for firm-level methods and for industry-level methods and we now investigate
this phenomenon in more detail.
Distortion and the duration effect. In our model economy the DCF-value of each
firm is a function of the true cost of capital: PDGP0 = P
DGP
0 (rE). (We suppress the
reference to the firm index for notational convenience.) Similarly, each ICC method's
valuation model implies a relationship between the implied cost of equity capital rME and
the equity value: PM0 = P
M
0 (r
M
E ), whereM indexes the implied cost of capital methods.
Hence, the model economy and each firm-level ICC method establish a relationship
PDGP0 (rE) = P
M
0 (r
M
E ). (19)
From the implicit function theorem we then have:
drME
drE
=
dPDGP0 (rE)
drE /
dPM0 (r
M
E )
drM
E
. (20)
The bivariate regressions in Table 6 simply estimate a linearized version of
drME
drE
in (20).
Hence, we obtain a large (small) slope coefficient in the regressions if the sensitivity
25We use the OLS estimates from Table 5, for example: rGLS = −2.3%+ 5% ∗ (1.2− 1.0) = −1.3%.
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of the firm value to the CoEC for the ICC's valuation model is smaller (larger) than
the same sensitivity for the data generating process. We therefore need to understand
the sensitivities
dPM0 (r
M
E )
drME
of firm values with respect to the cost of capital for each ICC
method and for the simulation model. However, this sensitivity is nothing but the
sensitivity of a present value relationship with respect to the discount rate, and we
know that these sensitivities depend critically on how soon the cash flows (or earnings
or dividends) are expected to arrive: The present values of cash flows that will arrive
in the immediate future are not sensitive to the discount rate, whereas the present
values of more distant cash flows are more sensitive. In the Appendix, we formalize this
intuition by relying on the notion of equity duration developed in Dechow, Sloan, and
Soliman (2004). Here we summarize the three main features of equity duration, which
we denote by DUR, and defer technical details to the Appendix:
• Equity duration measures the average maturity of future cash flows (or dividends)
discounted in a present value relation. Firms whose cash flows or dividends are
expected to arrive in the more distant future therefore have a larger equity dura-
tion.
• Duration increases with the expected future growth rate of the firm, i.e., growth
stocks have larger equity durations compared to value stocks. This relationship is
intuitive, because for faster growing firms, more of their value derives from cash
flows that are expected to arrive in the distant future.
• The sensitivity of firm value with respect to the CoEC is proportional to the
equity duration of the firm. In particular, the sensitivity from (20) is given by
drME
drE
=
DURDGP
DURM
, (21)
where DURDGP is the equity duration implied by the data generating process,
and DURM is the duration implied by the ICC method for the same firm. Hence,
drME
drE
is simply the ratio of the duration of the data generating process and that of
the ICC method.
From the last property and the fact that DURDGP is the same for all methods, it
follows immediately that the regression coefficient on the true CoEC in Table 6 should
be approximately equal to to DURDGP/DURM . We calculate the equity duration for
each ICC method using equation (28) from the appendix, and report the median values
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in column (7) of Table 6.26 Our fitted DCF model generates a median equity duration
of DURDGP = 18.91 years, i.e. the average cash flow in the model economy is almost
19 years away. By comparison, the median duration of the ICC methods ranges from
12.5 years (Easton) to 39.3 years (Easton and Sommers). These numbers compare to
the estimate of 15 years of Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman (2004). However, their method
is slightly different from ours and they assume a higher cost of capital.27 Based on (21)
we also calculate the ratio of DURDGP and DURM for each firm and report the mean
and median of this ratio in columns (8) and (9) of Table 6.
From comparing the distortion coefficients with the duration measures, and espe-
cially with the mean and median of the duration ratio, in Table 6 we can observe that
they are closely aligned.28 We do not expect this relationship to be perfect because
we are trying to capture the nonlinear relationship (20) with a linear regression and
can safely conclude that (21) yields a very good approximation for our purposes. We
can therefore attribute the pattern of distortion coefficients in Table 6 to the fact that
the equity duration measures implied by the firm-level ICC methods deviate from the
equity duration in our fitted model economy. We refer to this effect, which relates the
distortion of the cost of capital to the duration of the ICC method, as the duration
effect.
From the discussion above we expect that the main driver of the disparities between
the equity duration of the data generating process and that of the ICC methods are the
different assumptions about growth. From comparing the implied growth rates in Table
5 and the duration values in Table 6 we can see that there is such a relationship, although
the growth rates are only available for seven methods and not strictly comparable
because, as we remarked in the discussion of the bias, the growth rates of residual
income cannot be compared to those of abnormal earnings growth.
In addition to the duration effect, the distortion coefficient for the industry-level
methods is also affected by a second feature of these methods. All industry-level meth-
ods assume that growth and the cost of capital are the same for all firms within an
26We calculate the derivative dP0/drE numerically from (28) by evaluating the average change in
the value implied by a one basis point change in rE .
27Dechow, Sloan, and Soliman (2004) calculate equity durations implied by observed stock prices
whereas we use rational forecasts of future cash flows to determine equity durations. Moreover, they
assume a level perpetuity realized after ten years, which by construction leads to lower durations
compared to our model with perpetual growth.
28The mean value of DURDGP /DURMPEG in Table 6 is distorted by one single outlier for which
the ratio exceeds 10,000. Removing this outlier leads to a value of 1.26, which is in line with the
median value of 1.21.
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industry, which is not the case for our simulations. As a result, the variables in the
regressions suffer from an errors-in-variables problem, which causes an attenuation bias
for the slope coefficients and leads to a reduced sensitivity of the ICC to the true
CoEC.29 The bias decreases with the R-squared of the regression, which explains why
the distortion coefficient and the R-squareds for the four industry-level methods are
closely related and why the distortion coefficient for Easton's method is above one as
it also has an R-squared of 89% and therefore little attenuation bias.
Finally, we note that the distortion effect is unrelated to other factors that may
influence the cost of capital. As remarked above, our simulated economy neither features
the effects of size, stock market liquidity, transparency, and other factors that may affect
companies' cost of capital, nor does it model forecast bias on part of the analysts. These
factors play an important role in practice and would have to be added as controls in
regressions based on empirical observations.
Bias and distortion. Finally, we observe that the bias of the ICC methods is closely
related to the distortion coefficient. The relationship between distortion and bias can
be understood from Figure 2, which shows the relationship between firm value and the
CoEC for the simulated values (solid line) and for two typical firm-level ICC valuation
models (dotted line and dashed line). Now consider firm 1, which has a low true cost
of capital rE,1 and a high corresponding equity value P
DGP
0,1 , which we can read off the
function for the data generating process. Firm-level ICC method Mi now searches for
a cost of equity capital rMiE,1 for firm 1 that equates this equity value with that of the
model from (19). The resulting error in the cost of capital estimate is then rMiE,1 − rE,1,
which is negative and equal in absolute value to the horizontal distance between the two
curves. The same argument applies again to another firm 2, which has higher true cost
of capital rE,2, a low equity value P
DGP
0,2 , and a positive error r
Mi
E,2 − rE,2. In this case,
method 1 (dotted line), which exemplifies residual income methods, leads to a negative
bias because the underestimation when the true cost of capital are low is much larger
in absolute value than the overestimation when the true cost of capital is high. By
contrast, method 2 (dashed line), which is more typical for AEG methods, leads to a
positive bias because the overestimation is much larger. By experimenting with the
functions for different methods we found that a longer forecasting horizon leads to a
steeper function and therefore to a negative bias, whereas shorter forecasting horizons
29Easton (2004), Section IV discusses this problem. The attenuation bias moves the slope coefficients
towards zero.
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Figure 2: Value sensitivity for high and low value firms
This figure shows the convexity effect by illustrating the deviations arising for firms with with
high versus low firm values. The graphs highlight the value sensitivities with respect to changes
in the CoEC of the underlying data generating process (solid line) and two representative
firm-level ICC methods (dashed and dotted lines). We plot firms' cost of equity capital on the
horizontal axis and the market equity value on the vertical axis.
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lead to shallower functions and a positive bias.
5 Combining ICC methods
In the previous section we diagnose the strengths and deficiencies of the ICC methods.
In this section we turn to potential improvements in these methods. More specifically,
we consider several different ways of combining individual ICC methods. The first
method was suggested by Hail and Leuz (2006, 2009), who use an equally weighted
average of the methods of CT, GLS, GM, and the PEG ratio. In similar spirit, Dhaliwal,
Krull, and Li (2007) use the mean of CT, GLS, and GM. The third combination weights
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all ten methods equally. The fourth approach applies principal component analysis and
observes that the first component captures 71% of the variation in the ICC methods.30
This observation supports the notion that the ICC methods measure one common
factor. Also, the loadings of all methods on the first principal component are positive
and vary in a narrow range from 0.25 to 0.36 (these results are not tabulated).
Next, we construct weights from regression analysis as follows. We run regressions
of the true cost of capital rE on each of the ICC measures. The results are reported in
Table 7.
[Insert Table 7 here.]
Specification (1) is a standard OLS-regression without any restrictions. The R-
squared of this regression is 95.6%, so all ten methods combined leave only 4.4% of
the true cost of capital unexplained. This observation reinforces the conclusion from
principal component analysis that the ICC methods jointly capture a very large part of
the variation in the cost of capital. If all ICC methods were unbiased and not distorted,
then any combined method should result in regression coefficients that sum to one and
in an intercept of zero and thereby generate the optimal weights for a combined method.
However, combining the ICC measures in the way suggested by the coefficients from
this regression implies that the weights sum to 0.70, whereas the intercept is 0.042.
Regression (2) therefore restricts the regression coefficients to sum to one and sets the
constant to zero. Regression (3) requires in addition that weights be non-negative. Note
that several regression coefficients are close to zero now, in particular all the coefficients
for the AEG methods, except for the industry-level method of Easton.
Finally, we consider two simple combinations that emanate from the regression
analysis. Observe from regression (3) in Table 7 that only four methods are given
significant weights (CT, GLS, ETSS, and Easton) and that the weights are broadly
similar. We therefore construct an equally weighted average of these four methods and
label it Equally weighted - top four in the tables. Finally, we simplify even further
and combine only GLS and ETSS, the best two methods, with equal weights and report
it as GLS & ETSS in the tables. The reasoning for this combination is that we mainly
need to remove the distortion effect in order to simultaneously improve bias, accuracy,
and explainability. However, the distortion coefficient from firm-level methods is above
one, resulting in a negative bias, whereas the distortion coefficient from industry-level
30Hail and Leuz (2009) also use principal component analysis to extract a common factor from ICC
estimates.
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methods is below one, resulting in a positive bias. Combining two methods, one from
each category, should therefore suffice to address the main shortcomings we diagnose
in Section 4.
[Insert Table 8 here.]
Table 8 reports the key evaluation criteria we used in Section 4 and applies them to
the combined methods. With R-squareds up to 94.3%, many ICC combinations capture
a significant portion of the true cost of capital and improve substantially relative to
individual methods. Note that we have optimized the weights for the regression-based
methods to match the characteristics of our simulated sample. We can therefore not
legitimately compare the out-of-sample tests for ad hoc combinations with the in-sample
tests for regression-based methods.
The improvement for some of the combined methods is significant relative to the
individual methods. From the in-sample methods, the weighting scheme prescribed
by regression (2) performs best, with a median bias of -0.1%, a standard deviation of
1.0%, a distortion coefficient of 0.99, and an R-squared of 93.6%. Hence, this method
is practically unbiased and highly accurate and captures the true cost of capital almost
perfectly. Specifically, it outperforms the method based on unrestricted regressions,
which creates significant distortion, and the method based on principal components.
However, the method based on regression (2) requires the input of all ten methods and
can be computed only for the sample for which all these methods can be estimated.
From the ad hoc methods, Equally weighted - top four performs almost as well as
the best regression-based method, with a bias of -0.3%, a standard deviation of 1.1%,
and a distortion coefficient of 1.06. This combination outperforms all other ad hoc
methods as well as all individual methods. Recall that the lowest standard deviation
we observe among individual methods before is for CT (1.9%, see Table 5), which then
has substantially more bias and distortion. The GLS-ETSS combination performs
only marginally worse on all dimensions in our economy. It provides a useful trade-off
between simplicity and the ability to capture the true CoEC in most circumstances, and
may therefore be recommendable for applications. By contrast, the ad hoc methods
used in the prior literature (Hail and Leuz, Dahliwal et al.) perform significantly
worse, mostly because they include firm-level AEG methods, which also limits their
applicability.
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6 Extensions and robustness checks
All our results in the previous two sections rely on the simulated model and on the
parameterization we describe in Section 2 above. In this section we check to what
extent the results we report above may reflect features of the simulation model rather
than features of the ICC methods we wish to analyze. We want to make sure that the
salient properties of the ICC methods pertain to these models and not to the simulation
model.
[Insert Table 9 here.]
Table 9 summarizes the results for three different robustness checks (columns (2)
to (4)). For convenience, we repeat the corresponding results for the baseline model in
column (1). In panel A of the table we report the median of six key parameters for the
simulated values. In the other panels we report the bias (median, panel B), accuracy
(standard deviation, panel C) and explainability (distortion coefficient, panel D; R-
squared, panel E) for the ten individual ICC methods and for two selected combined
methods.
Alternative steady state model. In Section 2.2 above we justify the simulation
parameters with reference to the empirical sample, but deviate from the empirical
percentage-of-sales parameters in order to better match the valuation ratios. In the
alternative scenario in column (2) of Table 9 we use a parameterization that matches
the empirical depreciation-to-sales ratio and the equity-to-sales ratio more closely by
using 3.5% for the former (median in Compustat sample: 3.6%) and 50% for the latter
(sample median: 48.9%). With these parameters the steady-state value for the equity-
to-sales ratio is 48.8% from (8).
As a result, valuations for this parameterizations are somewhat higher with a
market-to-book ratio of 1.57 and a PE ratio of 14.09, where the latter now exceeds
the empirical median by 2.3, which renders this parameterization somewhat worse in
terms of valuation. The mean bias tends to become negative, but stays about the same
in absolute value. Accuracy improves for all methods, but the ranking across methods
stays the same as in the baseline case. Similarly, the distortion coefficient declines, but
the patterns across methods is not affected. R-squareds also improve slightly. The two
combined methods still improve significantly on each of the individual methods for all
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parameters except for the distortion coefficient, where the GLS-ETSS combination now
overweighs ETSS. Overall, the general conclusions we derived above are not affected.
Analyst forecast bias. In our baseline model we generate forecasts from the vector
autoregressive model (1) and (2) and the business planning model. This approach im-
plicitly assumes rational expectations and unbiased forecasts. However, these forecasts
from the VAR model take the place of analyst forecasts in the implementation of the
ICC methods, and a large literature documents that analyst forecasts are biased (see
e.g. Brown 1993, Kothari 2001). Moreover, Easton and Sommers (2007) argue that
analyst forecasts bias ICC methods. We therefore repeat our analysis by creating an
optimistic bias and report the results in column (3) of Table 9. Starting from the base-
line scenario, we calculate the ROE for each firm and each period for which the ICC
methods require analyst forecasts, and then add 3% to this ROE value.31 We then re-
calculate residual income and abnormal earnings growth with this increased ROE. Note
that this modification does not change what really happens in our economy (hence, in
panel A, the numbers in column (3) are the same as those in column (1)). Similarly,
the results in panels B to E for the ICC methods that rely on realized returns are un-
affected. As expected, analyst optimism leads to higher ICC estimates and generates a
larger positive bias, in particular for the residual income methods, ETSS, and Easton.
Whereas the average bias across the eight methods that use analyst forecasts is 1.7% for
the baseline model, it is 2.3% with the simulated analyst forecast bias. The results for
accuracy are slightly worse with the analyst forecast bias and the distortion effect also
gets somewhat worse. Overall, however, the analyst forecast bias erodes only a small
part of the advantage of methods based on analyst forecasts relative to those based on
realizations.
Dividend discount model. Finally, we also check for the impact of the valuation
model we use to generate simulated firm values. In our baseline model we use a stan-
dard DCF model to generate firm values. Our business planning model also generates
expectations for future dividends, based on the assumed values for the plowback rate
and we therefore repeat the analysis with firm values generated by the dividend discount
31Easton and Sommers (2007) find 3 percentage points CoEC bias. We use these 3 percentage
points as an estimate for the bias of ROE forecasts. Although the magnitude of analysts' optimism
reported in the literature varies considerably across studies (Kothari 2001), and is typically expressed
in percentage of stock price or per share, our 3 percentage points above ROE forecasts are in the upper
range of reported optimism.
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model. Column (4) panel A shows that this has a large impact on firm values. Firm
values are now somewhat lower and also lower than in the Compustat sample.32 Oth-
erwise, very little changes with respect to the analysis of the ICC methods. Whereas
the estimates for bias and R-squared based on the dividend discount model are very
similar to those obtained with the DCF model, those for accuracy and distortion are
somewhat worse. However, all qualitative conclusions still hold.
Industry-level methods (not tabulated). In our simulated economy, industry-
level methods have specific properties, which add to the construction of combined meth-
ods. We run two robustness checks adressing potential issues regarding the validity of
these results.
First, our assumptions about the dispersion of the true cost of capital are somewhat
ad hoc because little can be known about the parameters of the distribution of the true
cost of capital. Our baseline specification assumes that the true cost of capital have an
overall standard deviation of 4.2% from (10), where most of the variation comes from
the variation between industries and very little comes from the variation between firms
within the same industry. We change the parameterization so that the within-industry
variation equals the between-industry variation, holding the overall standard deviation
constant. As expected, the results are very similar for the firm-level methods, but
industry-level methods perform worse in terms of accuracy and explainability, and the
optimal weights when constructing combined methods would need to change. Neverthe-
less, even under this demanding scenario, the combined methods that give some weight
to industry-level methods are generally at least at par with the individual methods in
terms of accuracy and explainability (R-squared, distortion-coefficient).
Second, we perform a simulation where we draw 2,000 industries with only 10 firms
each in order to investigate the performance of ICC methods for small industries, an
issue regression-based methods face in real world applications. Unsurprisingly, the
accuracy of industry-level methods that rely on realized values instead of forecasts
declines substantially. Interestingly, ETSS and Easton are now less distorted, i.e., the
distortion coefficient is closer to one. The combined methods we advocate still perform
better than almost all other approaches.
32Recall that Modigliani and Miller (1961) dividend irrelevance does not hold here. In their argu-
ment, cash that is distributed and cash that is retained both earn the cost of capital, whereas in our
model cash retained in the firm is reinvested and generates the same return as all other capital invested
in the firm.
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Further checks (not tabulated). We perform several further robustness checks,
but do not tabulate the results here. More specifically, we modify the parameters of
the VAR process to generate more or less persistence in the response of EBITDA and
sales growth to a shock, and we also change the length of the detailed planning period
to 25 years and to 75 years, respectively. The change in the time series parameters has
no discernible impact on our main inferences. We therefore do not pursue this avenue
further and conclude that our results are robust to perturbations of the times series
model we use.
Shortening the time horizon for the planning period in our model reduces valuations,
whereas lengthening the time horizon increases valuations. This is simply a consequence
of the fact that we assume zero growth for the horizon value, so that longer detailed
planning periods also imply more growth. This modification has a corresponding impact
on the bias, but only a very marginal impact on accuracy. The average distortion
coefficient also does not change much with the horizon of the model, but the difference
in distortion between firm-level methods and industry-level methods increases with the
time horizon. Consequently, the assessment of the combined methods does not change.
Our assumption of a plowback rate of 50% differs from the empirical rate of 65% in
our Compustat sample. We performed an additional check where we set the plowback
rate to 65% and found that its main impact is to reduce the market-to-book ratio to
1.33, significantly below the median empirical ratio of 1.61. All findings we discuss
above are robust with respect to this change.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we compare implied cost of capital methods by using a simulation ap-
proach. We calibrate a simulated economy to a large sample of real-world data. We
obtain a number of robust conclusions with regard to the properties of the methods as
well as to their application in empirical studies.
Within the group of firm-level methods, residual income methods uniformly domi-
nate abnormal earnings growth methods. Abnormal earnings growth methods have a
significant positive bias, whereas residual income methods have a negative bias that is
less than half of that of abnormal earnings growth methods in absolute value. Similar
conclusions also hold for accuracy, which we measure by the standard deviation of the
estimation errors, and for the R-squared of regressions of the ICC estimates on the true
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cost of equity capital.
The essential difference between abnormal earnings growth methods and residual
income methods is the modeling of abnormal earnings. Whereas residual income meth-
ods model the growth of future abnormal earnings, abnormal earnings growth methods
model the changes in future abnormal earnings. Abnormal earnings growth methods
therefore take an approach that focuses on the first derivative of abnormal earnings
instead of abnormal earnings themselves, and this approach seems to lose information
that is critical for valuation purposes and leads to less reliable forecasts.
The performance of industry-level methods that simultaneously estimate the cost
of capital and expected growth is somewhere in between the two groups of firm-level
methods. Especially those industry-level methods that rely on analyst forecasts perform
remarkably well and in some cases come close to the performance of residual income
methods, even if we allow for a 3% bias in analyst forecasts.
In addition to the average bias of each method we also consider whether the methods
distort the true cost of capital by running regressions of the ICC estimates against the
true cost of equity capital. If the methods are not distorted, then the slope coefficient in
these regressions should be one, but it is in fact larger than one for all firm-level methods
and smaller than one for three out of four industry-level methods. We attribute this
finding to two factors. The first factor is the equity duration of the methods, i.e., how
far earnings growth is projected into the future. The second factor is the errors-in-
variables problem that arises in industry-level methods if the firms within the same
industry do not all have the same growth rate and the same cost of capital.
We explore improvements of implied cost of capital estimates by aggregating several
estimates through the calculation of averages of the individual methods. We identify
weighting schemes based on regression analysis and principal components analysis as
well as ad hoc, equally weighted methods that work well. The analysis of the individual
methods suggests that residual income methods and industry-level methods based on
forecasts provide good components for combined methods because they are biased and
distorted in the opposite direction. Combinations that give equal weights to both classes
of methods therefore benefit from compensating errors and outperform all individual
methods.
Researchers have come to rely on ICC estimates as proxies for the cost of capital in
a range of applications when testing related economic theories.33 For these applications
33Examples include Botosan (1997) on voluntary disclosure; Hail and Leuz (2006) on the impact of
legal institutions and securities regulation; Pastor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2008) on the risk-return
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accuracy and bias are less relevant, because they mainly rely on estimates that capture
a large part of the variation in the cost of capital. In our simulations, individual ICC
methods capture up to 89% and one of the combined methods captures up to 94% of the
variation in the true cost of equity capital, which provides an optimistic outlook on the
use of ICC estimates in such research. As a note of caution, we add that some sources
of noise that may be relevant in empirical settings are not included in our simulated
economy.
All our conclusions are limited by the simulation approach we use here, which relies
on a business planning model, the time-series modeling of the dynamics of profitability
and sales growth, and its calibration towards median valuation ratios of the CRSP-
Compustat universe. We had little guidance from the literature on this effort, which
has primarily focused on the short-term dynamics of key accounting variables (e.g.
Bernard and Thomas 1989). Little seems to be known about the long-term time-series
properties of key accounting variables or the dynamics of the main value drivers (see
Dechow, Kothari, and Watts 1998 for a short-term model) and more work is needed
here.
trade-off; Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-Molina (2009) on the influence of labor relations; Daske (2006)
on voluntary and Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2008) on mandatory IFRS adoption; Hail and Leuz
(2009) on cross listings; and Hou and Van Dijk (2010) on the size effect.
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Appendix
Steady-state values for financial ratios:
The plowback rate is defined as pb = (et−dt)/et. With this definition, the clean surplus
relation (5) becomes bvt = bvt−1+etpb.We can therefore write the growth rate of equity
gE,t as:
gE,t =
bvt − bvt−1
bvt−1
=
etpb
bvt−1
= roetpb. (22)
In a steady state, the growth rates for sales and for the book value of equity are the
same, which gives (7).
Pre-tax income is St(m− d), so that net income can be expressed as:
et = (m− d)(1− T )St. (23)
The growth rate of equity from (22) becomes:
gE,t =
pb(m− d)(1− T )St.
bvt−1
. (24)
We can rewrite bvt = (1 + gE,t)bvt−1 and, in a steady state, gE,t = gS,t. Substituting
these expressions and rearranging gives (8).
Duration
Let fcft be the expected free cash flow of the firm at time t. Let DUR be the equity
duration for the data generating process and define it as:
DUR =
1
1 + rE
∞∑
t=1
t
fcft
PDGP0 (1 + rE)
t
. (25)
is defined as a weighted average of the maturities of all future free cash flows (earnings,
dividends, etc.), where the weight for each maturity is the proportion of the correspond-
ing cash flow in the value of the firm:34
The concept of duration can also be applied to valuation models independently of
34We premultiply by 1/(1 + r) for convenience. Our definition of duration in equation (25) corre-
sponds to the definition of modified duration in the literature because we divide by 1 + rE . This
definition facilitates the exposition because it eliminates the factor 1 + rE from (28).
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whether they discount cash flows, dividends, or abnormal earnings. This follows from a
general property of duration, which allows us to easily obtain the duration for the data
generating process and for each of the models. Let P0 be the current equity value:
P0 =
t=∞∑
t=1
fcft (1 + rE)
−t . (26)
Then the first derivative is:
dP0
drE
= −
t=∞∑
t=1
t fcft (1 + rE)
−(t+1) . (27)
Multiplying both sides of (27) by 1/P0 yields
−dP0(rE)
drE
1
P0
= DUR. (28)
Hence, the sensitivity of percentage changes in equity values with respect to the CoEC
is equal to their duration. From (28) we can obtain the duration simply from calculating
the first derivative of the respective valuation equation.
We demonstrate this claim for the simple case of dividends and the constant growth
model:
PGordon0 =
d1
rE − g , (29)
where PGordon0 is the equity value according to the Gordon growth model for some
constant dividend growth rate g and dividend d1. From (28) and (29) we have:
DURGordon = −dP
Gordon
0
drE
1
PGordon0
=
rE − g
d1
d1
(rE − g)2
=
1
rE − g . (30)
We can proceed similarly with the valuation equations of all residual income and ab-
normal earnings growth models used by the ICC methods we discuss in this paper.
Claim 1: Equity duration measures average maturity. This claim follows di-
rectly from the definition and from observing that the weight wt of maturity t is
fcft(1 + rE)
t/P0 and that
∑
twt = 1. Then DUR = (1 + rE)
−1∑
t twt. For exam-
ple, the equity duration of a firm that has only one cash flow at time T (all other cash
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flows are zero) is simply T (1 + rE)
−1 because then wT = 1. Hence, apart from the
normalization factor 1/(1 + rE), duration measures the average maturity of the cash
flows associated with the firm.
Claim 2: Equity duration is an increasing function of the growth rate. Define
the t-period growth rate of cash flows by 1 +Gt = fcft/fcf0. Then from the definition
of the weight wt above, wt = (1+Gt)fcf0(1+rE)
t/P0, which is increasing in the growth
rate. Hence, for faster growing firms later maturities receive a higher weight so that the
average maturity becomes larger. For the Gordon growth model, DURGordon increases
with the constant growth rate g.
Claim 3: Derivation of equation (21). The claim in the text that the sensitivity of
firm value with respect to the CoEC is proportional to the equity duration is expressed
in (28). Apply the implicit function theorem to (19) to obtain:
dPDGP0 (rE)
drE
drE =
dPM0 (r
M
E )
drME
drME ⇒ −DURDGPP0drE = −DURMP0dME . (31)
Dividing both sides by −P0 and rearranging yields (21).
We note that duration analysis applies strictly only to firm-level methods and not to
industry-level methods, because for the latter (19) does not hold individually for each
firm.35
35Industry-level methods determine the growth rate endogenously, but the sensitivity of the ICC
to the true cost of capital depends on the cash flow patterns for the entire portfolio and not on the
patterns of the individual firm. Exploring this more intricate relationship analytically is beyond the
scope of this appendix.
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Tables
Table 1: Key financial ratios and model parameters
This table shows summary statistics for a CRSP-Compustat sample of 8,036 firms with 96,917 firm-
year observations between 1970 and 2009. The table includes univariate statistics for the main value
drivers, percentages of sales and financial ratios of the sample firms using CRSP-Compustat data.
All variables are winsorized at the 1%-level. Payout consists of common dividends. Return on assets
(equity) is defined as net income divided by the book value of total assets (equity). The price earnings
ratio is computed as the share price divided by earnings per share (EPS), where EPS is net income
divided by the number of common shares outstanding. Leverage is defined as book value of long
term debt divided by total assets plus market capitalization minus book value of equity. The model
parameters used later in the simulation framework are presented in the last column.
Model
Variable 25% 50% 75% Mean STD Obs. parameters
Sales growth 1.0% 10.6% 23.8% 17.9% 39.6% 96,719 6.0%
EBITDA margin 5.8% 11.4% 18.6% 3.7% 60.8% 96,719 12.0%
Sales 48.2 170.2 689.2 1156.2 3176.3 96,719 100.0
Time-series std of sales growth 12.7% 19.9% 33.6% 28.2% 24.1% 96,031 20.0%
Time-series std of margin 2.8% 4.7% 9.1% 13.9% 32.6% 96,031 5.0%
Payout to net income 20.4% 34.8% 57.3% 41.4% 27.1% 43,601 N(0.5, 0.1)
Depreciation to sales 2.1% 3.6% 6.4% 6.2% 8.7% 96,719 5.0%
Current assets to sales 25.6% 37.4% 58.4% 106.1% 180.6% 96,719 35.0%
PPE to sales 11.4% 21.5% 46.3% 50.3% 78.2% 96,719 20.0%
Current liabilities to sales 13.8% 19.6% 29.4% 29.6% 36.4% 96,719 20.0%
Equity to sales 30.3% 48.9% 86.0% 104.4% 208.1% 96,719 40.0%
Market-to-book equity 0.94 1.61 2.99 2.99 4.21 96,719
Return on assets 0.9% 5.1% 9.7% 3.0% 14.8% 96,719
Book return on equity 2.4% 10.7% 18.0% 7.1% 30.1% 96,719
PE-ratio 4.60 11.79 21.46 17.06 51.16 96,719
Leverage 4.2% 19.5% 41.6% 25.6% 23.9% 96,719
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Table 2: Estimates for panel vector autoregressions
This table shows estimates from panel vector autoregressions of equations (1) and (2). Panel A shows
the results for the sample from Table 1. We regress sales growth and EBITDA margins on lagged sales
and margins using panel vector autoregressions. The data for sales growth and margins is winsorized
at the 1%-level. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Panel B documents the correlation matrix
of the residuals from the panel VAR. Panel C reports the modeling parameters for long-term sales
growth and EBITDA margin used later in the simulation framework.
Panel A: Panel VAR results
Statistics Sales growth
equation
Margin equation
Sales growth(t-1) 0.166 -0.004
(0.007) (0.007)
Margin(t-1) -0.166 0.596
(0.017) (0.022)
Obs. 81,036 81,036
Panel B: Residual correlation matrix
Sales growth Margin
Sales growth 1.000
Margin 0.354*** 1.000
Panel C: Long-term sales growth and margin
Sales growth Margin
Avg. firm-specific intercepts 0.070 0.049
Avg. long-term rates 6.0% 12.0%
STD of long-term rates 2.0% 1.0%
Table 3: Comparison of simulated values vs. empirical data
This table shows the differences between the simulated data and the empirical data based on the
CRSP-Compustat sample. Differences are constructed by subtracting the corresponding quantiles of
the empirical data from the simulated data.
Difference: Simulated - real data
Variable 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Sales growth -9.13% -8.56% -4.80% -3.84% -16.21%
EBITDA margin 5.44% 2.00% 0.65% -2.37% -9.30%
Market-to-book equity -0.12 -0.16 -0.20 -0.03 0.55
Return on assets 9.16% 1.80% 2.21% 3.29% 3.85%
Book return on equity 17.26% 1.50% 0.08% 1.73% 1.26%
PE-ratio 2.61 0.46 -0.93 5.96 28.94
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Table 4: Implied cost of equity capital methods
This table summarizes the salient features of the individual implied cost of equity capital methods
analyzed in this study. Altogether, we test ten different methods suggested in prior literature. We
classify each method according to the model type (RI=residual income, AEG=abnormal earnings
growth), the level of estimation (firm-level or industry-level), the data input (analyst forecasts or
realized values), and the time horizon of the detailed forecast period in years. Column (5) describes
the modeling strategy for the terminal value, which is either a perpetuity or a model where values
converge before the perpetual growth stage is reached. Column (6) shows the estimates for terminal
growth.
Terminal value modeling
Model Level Input Horizon Method Growth
Method (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Claus and Thomas
(2001)
RI Firm Forecasts 5 Perpetuity g_RI = rf-3%
Gebhardt et al. (2001) RI Firm Forecasts 3 Fading to 12;
Perp. after 12
g_RI = 0%
Gode and Mohanram
(2003)
AEG Firm Forecasts 2 Perpetuity g_AEG = rf-3%
PE ratio AEG Firm Forecasts 1 Perpetuity AGR(2) = 0
PEG ratio AEG Firm Forecasts 2 Perpetuity DIV(1) = 0;
g_AEG = 0
MPEG ratio AEG Firm Forecasts 2 Perpetuity g_AEG = 0
Easton et al. (2002) RI Industry Forecasts 4 Perpetuity endogenous RI
growth
Easton (2004) AEG Industry Forecasts 2 Perpetuity endogenous AE
growth
O'Hanlon and Steele
(2000)
RI Industry Realizations 0 Perpetuity endogenous RI
growth
Easton and Sommers
(2007)
RI Industry Realizations 1 realized Perpetuity endogenous RI
growth
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Table 7: Construction of combined implied cost of capital methods
This table documents the regression analysis for the construction of combined methods, where we
estimate the following regression:
rE,i = θ0 +
∑M=10
M=1 θMr
M
E,i,
where rE,i is the true cost of capital of firm i and r
M
E,i is the ICC estimate of the cost of cap-
ital of firm i using method M. Hence, we jointly regress firms' true CoEC on all ten ICC method
estimates. In model (1) we conduct an unrestricted OLS regression including an intercept. We apply
restricted regressions in models (2) and (3). Model (2) requires coefficients to sum to one and excludes
the intercept (θ = 0,
∑M=10
M=1 θM = 1). Model (3) requires in addition that coefficients lie within the
unit interval (0 ≤ θM ≤ 1).
No constant, No negative
Unrestricted weights sum to one weights
Specification (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 0.042***
Claus and Thomas (2001) 0.023** 0.14 0.17
Gebhardt et al. (2001) 0.123*** 0.24 0.26
Gode and Mohanram (2003) -0.195*** -0.13 0.00
PE-ratio 0.165*** 0.02 0.01
PEG ratio 0.052*** 0.00 0.02
MPEG ratio 0.269*** 0.18 0.00
Easton et al. (2002) -0.149*** 0.47 0.36
Easton (2004) 0.412*** 0.18 0.18
O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) 0.013*** -0.11 0.00
Easton and Sommers (2007) -0.010*** 0.01 0.00
R-Squared 95.6%
Obs. (in % of total sample) 56.1% 56.1% 56.1%
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Table 9: Robustness checks
This table shows the results of several robustness checks, where we assess alternative specifications
of our simulated model economy to see how the results are affected by the choice of the underlying
model. We repeat results for the baseline model in column (1). The alternative specifications include
(2) an adjusted steady-state model, where the equity- and depreciation-to-sales ratio is 50% and 3.5%
to match the empirical parameters; (3) an analyst forecast bias model, where we assume that earnings
forecasts are optimistic such that returns on equity forecasts are biased upward by 3 percentage points
for every firm in every forecast period; (4) the use of a dividend discount model instead of a discounted
cash flow model. Panel A shows the median values for key financial ratios from Table 3. Panels B to
E shows the results for the median bias, standard deviation, the distortion coefficient, and R-squared.
Panel A: Simulated data comparison
Baseline Adjusted steady- Analyst Dividend
model state model forecast
bias
discount model
Median accounting item (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales growth 5.8% 5.8% 5.8% 5.8%
EBITDA margin 12.0% 12.0% 12.0% 12.0%
Market-to-book equity 1.42 1.57 1.42 1.25
PE-ratio 10.86 14.09 10.86 9.37
Duration 18.91 18.70 18.91 18.63
CoEC (HML) 10.39% 10.57% 10.39% 9.91%
Panel B: Median bias
Claus and Thomas (2001) -1.0% -2.0% 1.7% 0.1%
Gebhardt et al. (2001) -0.1% -1.5% 1.0% 0.9%
Gode and Mohanram (2003) 4.0% 1.9% 4.6% 4.6%
PE ratio -1.3% -2.5% 1.3% 0.9%
PEG ratio 1.8% -0.3% 1.7% 2.2%
MPEG ratio 3.2% 1.1% 3.2% 3.8%
Easton et al. (2002) 0.9% 0.3% 3.4% 1.2%
Easton (2004) -1.0% -2.1% 1.2% 0.5%
O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) 1.3% 0.4% 1.3% 1.3%
Easton and Sommers (2007) 1.2% 0.6% 1.2% 1.3%
Equally weighted - top four -0.3% -1.3% 1.8% 0.7%
GLS & ETSS 0.4% -0.6% 2.2% 1.1%
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Panel C: Method accuracy (standard deviation)
Method (1) (2) (3) (4)
Claus and Thomas (2001) 1.9% 1.0% 3.0% 2.7%
Gebhardt et al. (2001) 2.3% 1.9% 2.9% 3.5%
Gode and Mohanram (2003) 6.6% 4.6% 6.4% 6.3%
PE ratio 4.6% 3.5% 5.9% 7.9%
PEG ratio 7.1% 5.2% 7.0% 6.9%
MPEG ratio 6.3% 4.3% 6.1% 5.9%
Easton et al. (2002) 2.3% 2.6% 2.3% 2.5%
Easton (2004) 2.0% 1.5% 2.7% 2.2%
O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) 3.4% 2.8% 3.4% 3.4%
Easton and Sommers (2007) 3.7% 2.9% 3.7% 3.7%
Equally weighted - four 1.1% 0.8% 1.6% 1.3%
GLS & ETSS 1.3% 1.4% 1.4% 1.7%
Panel D: Method explainability (CoEC coefficient)
Claus and Thomas (2001) 1.18 1.05 1.55 1.37
Gebhardt et al. (2001) 1.20 1.10 1.36 1.34
Gode and Mohanram (2003) 1.48 1.24 1.58 1.53
PE ratio 1.45 1.28 1.90 1.85
PEG ratio 1.23 1.01 1.22 1.25
MPEG ratio 1.47 1.24 1.48 1.53
Easton et al. (2002) 0.60 0.45 0.58 0.44
Easton (2004) 1.24 1.06 1.46 1.32
O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) 0.65 0.54 0.65 0.29
Easton and Sommers (2007) 0.47 0.43 0.47 0.24
Equally weighted - top four 1.06 0.91 1.24 1.12
GLS & ETSS 0.90 0.77 0.97 0.89
Panel E: Method explainability (R-squared)
Claus and Thomas (2001) 88.0% 94.2% 89.1% 84.8%
Gebhardt et al. (2001) 83.1% 84.3% 81.8% 72.4%
Gode and Mohanram (2003) 46.6% 54.4% 52.2% 51.1%
PE ratio 64.9% 69.4% 72.2% 51.2%
PEG ratio 32.4% 37.2% 33.0% 34.9%
MPEG ratio 48.6% 57.4% 50.6% 54.2%
Easton et al. (2002) 68.3% 61.9% 68.0% 68.4%
Easton (2004) 89.2% 89.3% 89.0% 89.4%
O'Hanlon and Steele (2000) 40.0% 51.1% 40.0% 25.3%
Easton and Sommers (2007) 27.0% 44.7% 27.0% 15.4%
Equally weighted - top four 94.3% 96.3% 93.7% 93.4%
GLS & ETSS 89.3% 89.5% 93.7% 93.4%
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